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RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 8605
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FROM DRAPER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PINS, MOPS, MILI, SY, LE, US, IS, XF
SUBJECT: DRAPER MISSION: ISRAELIS DO NOT ACCEPT
COMPROMISE AGENDA FORMULA

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

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2. SUMMARY: ISRAELIS HAVE DECLINED THE COMPROMISE AGENDA FORMULA WHICH I PROPOSED, PRIMARILY BECAUSE THEY SEE IT AS A CONCESSION TO LEBANESE PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN AND THEY DO NOT WANT TO ENCOURAGE WAZZAN TO BELIEVE THAT HE HAS A VETO OVER THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. I SAID THE U.S. WAS NOT GOING TO GO ALONG WITH A GOVERNMENT CRISIS IN BEIRUT OVER SENSITIVE AGENDA WORDING PROBLEMS, WHEN THE LEBANESE WERE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE REAL SUBSTANCE OF NORMALIZATION. ISRAELIS WILL WAIT TO HEAR LEBANESE POSITION TOMORROW IN KIRYAT SHEMONA. BASED ON OUR DISCUSSIONS HERE AND IN LEBANON, THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE THAT TOMORROW'S SESSION WILL AGAIN FAIL TO PRODUCE AN AGREED AGENDA OR OTHERWISE PERMIT THE INITIATION OF SUBSTANTIVE TALKS. END SUMMARY.

3. ACCOMPANIED BY CHARGE FLATEN AND KRECZKO, I MET WITH FOMMIN SHAMIR, HIS DEPUTY BEN-MEIR, TAMIR, KIMCHE, BAR-ON, "MANDY," RUBINSTEIN, AND OTHERS ON JANUARY 5 TO REVIEW WHERE WE STOOD ON THE EFFORT TO PRODUCE AN AGENDA FOR THE LEBANON/ISRAEL NEGOTIATIONS. I OUTLINED THE PROPOSAL WHICH I HAD WORKED OUT WITH THE LEBANESE (TEXT IN PARA 10 BELOW), EMPHASIZING THAT ITS MAIN VIRTUE FROM THE ISRAELI PERSPECTIVE SHOULD BE THE WRITTEN ACCEPTANCE BY LEBANON OF DISCUSSION ON ALL ITEMS ON THE ISRAELI AGENDA, INCLUDING SUCH ITEMS AS NORMALIZATION AND OPEN BORDERS. ALTHOUGH INITIALLY INTRIGUED WITH THE IDEA, SHAMIR EVENTUALLY CONCLUDED THAT HE BELIEVED IT WAS UNSATISFACTORY. ON THE SUBSTANTIVE SIDE, HE BELIEVES THAT THE OFFICIAL AGENDA WAS THIN ON THE NORMALIZATION ISSUE, AND THAT THE LEBANESE ACQUIESCENCE IN THE ISRAELI AGENDA WAS DISGUISED IN THE FORM I PROPOSED. HOWEVER, SHAMIR'S MAIN OBJECTION WAS THAT OUR PROPOSAL WAS A STEP-BACK FROM THE LAST LEBANESE PROPOSAL, WHICH THE ISRAELIS KNOW WAS WITHDRAWN BECAUSE OF WAZZAN'S OBJECTION TO THE PROPOSAL. SHAMIR SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD USE ITS INFLUENCE TO CONVINCE WAZZAN TO ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL. TO GIVE IN WOULD ENCOURAGE WAZZAN TO BELIEVE THAT HE HAS A VETO OVER THE NORMALIZATION PROCESS, AND WOULD

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FRUSTRATE THE SUBSTANTIVE TALKS. SHAMIR CONCLUDED THAT HE WOULD RAISE OUR SUGGESTION WITH THE MINISTERIAL STEERING COMMITTEE, NOT AS A PROPOSAL, BUT AS AN IDEA.

4. I SAID THAT WE HAD PERSUADED GEMAYEL TO ACCEPT THE JANUARY 3 PROPOSAL OF THE LEBANESE DELEGATION, PROVIDED WAZZAN WOULD GO ALONG. HOWEVER, DESPITE OUR EFFORTS, WAZZAN WOULD NOT AGREE. I MENTIONED THAT WAZZAN WAS SO OPPOSED TO THE PROPOSAL THAT HE HAD THREATENED TO RESIGN IF IT WERE ACCEPTED. (TAMIR SAID THAT IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL IF WAZZAN RESIGNED) I SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS NOT GOING TO FORCE A GOVERNMENTAL CRISIS IN LEBANON OVER THE FORMULATION OF THE AGENDA.) A RECURRING THEME WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER, KIMCHE, BEN-MEIR AND LATER INTERIOR MINISTER BURG, WAS THE ISRAELI CONVICTION THAT IF THE UNITED STATES HAD PUSHED HARDER, GEMAYEL WOULD HAVE ACCEPTED THE FORMULA PROPOSED BY THE LEBANESE DELEGATION AND THEN REJECTED BY GEMAYEL. I STRIDENTLY REJECTED THIS PERCEPTION IN ALL MEETINGS. SHAMIR SAID THAT THE ADVANTAGE OF THE JANUARY 3 PROPOSAL WAS THAT IT COMMITTED THE LEBANESE TO ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NORMALIZATION. HE SAID IT IS VERY IMPORTANT FOR THE ISRAELIS TO KNOW AT THE START THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT ACCEPTS THIS PRINCIPLE. BEN-MEIR ADDED THAT WITH THE COMPROMISE FORMULA THE LEBANESE WOULD ONLY HAVE AGREED THAT THE ISRAELI DELEGATION COULD RAISE THE ITEMS ON ITS AGENDA. WHAT THAT MEANS, ACCORDING TO SHAMIR AND BEN-MEIR, IS THAT WITH THE COMPROMISE FORMULA, THE LEBANESE HAVE NOT ACCEPTED

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ANYTHING. SHAMIR AND BEN-MEIR BOTH NOTED THAT THIS IS NOT AN ARGUMENT OVER A WORD OR TWO. IT IS A QUESTION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF LEBANESE ACCEPTANCE OF THE CONCEPT OF DEALING WITH ISRAEL. LATER BEN-MEIR ADDED THAT IT IS ALSO CLEAR TO THE LEBANESE THAT IT IS AN IMPORTANT QUESTION. IF NOT, WAZZAN WOULD NOT HAVE THREATENED TO RESIGN

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OVER THIS ISSUE.

5. I LUNCHED WITH KIMCHE AND TAMIR IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE MINISTERIAL MEETING. THEY REPORTED (AND BURG SUBSEQUENTLY CONFIRMED) THAT MY PROPOSAL WAS UNSATISFACTORY TO ISRAEL. ISRAEL WOULD START TOMORROW'S SESSION ON THE BASIS OF THE LAST LEBANESE PROPOSAL, AND WOULD WANT TO HAVE DIRECT CONFIRMATION, AND AN EXPLANATION, FROM LEBANON CONCERNING THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF LEBANON'S FORMER PROPOSAL. TAMIR RESURRECTED THE SHARON WORKING PAPER; HE SAID ISRAEL WOULD NOT ALLOW WAZZAN TO FORCE GEMAYEL TO BACK AWAY FROM IT. I WARNED KIMCHE THAT THE LEBANESE WOULD INDEED RETRACT THEIR FORMER PROPOSAL AND THAT WE ALL SHOULD BE THINKING THIS EVENING OF NEW IDEAS TO GET US BEYOND THE AGENDA DEBATE AND INTO THE SUBSTANCE. TAMIR ALSO INSISTED THAT THE ORIGINAL ISRAELI AGENDA HAD BEEN AGREED TO BY THE LEBANESE IN THE SECRET CHANNEL. HE ALSO INSISTED THAT THE GOI WOULD NOT LET WAZZAN FORCE GEMAYEL TO ABANDON ITS ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS.

6. WE ALSO DISCUSSED SOME OF THE SUBSTANTIVE ITEMS WITH KIMCHE AND TAMIR, WHO SAID THAT ISRAEL WOULD WELCOME CONTINUED SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH US. I AGREED. IN THE COURSE OF THE SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION, TAMIR SAID THAT ISRAEL WILL NOT INSIST ON A LENGTHY WITHDRAWAL PERIOD. IF SYRIA CAN WITHDRAW IN ONE MONTH, ISRAEL CAN ALSO. HOWEVER, BECAUSE THE LAF, WHICH WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR SECURITY IN THE SOUTH, WILL TAKE SOME TIME TO BE STRENGTHENED, ISRAEL WILL INSIST ON INTERIM MEASURES SUCH AS EARLY WARNING STATIONS AND AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE FOR AN AGREED PERIOD.

7. I ALSO HAD A BRIEF MEETING WITH DR. BURG, WHO CONSIDERS HIMSELF PRIMARILY A SPECTATOR ON LEBANON ISSUES. BURG CONFIRMED THAT THE MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE HAD REJECTED OUR PROPOSED COMPROMISE, BUT EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE WAS RICH ENOUGH TO FIND AN ACCEPTABLE FORMULA. BURG ALSO CONFIRMED THAT WHILE HE HAD NO QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE U.S.

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ROLE, "OTHERS" WERE CHARGING THAT THE U.S. WAS PREVENTING LEBANON FROM REACHING AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL.

8. IN A LONG MEETING WITH DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER BEN-MEIR THIS EVENING, WE WENT OVER AGAIN MUCH OF THE SAME GROUND. BEN-MEIR SPENT MUCH OF THE MEETING REITERATING THE ISRAELI CONVICTION THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL IS COMMITTED TO HONEST NEGOTIATIONS AND HAS PROVEN ITS GOOD FAITH BY THE CONCESSIONS THAT HAD BEEN MADE DURING THE PAST THREE MONTHS. HE NOTED THAT ISRAEL BACKED AWAY FROM INSISTENCE ON A TREATY WITH LEBANON EVEN THOUGH THE PRIME MINISTER HAD PROMISED A PEACE TREATY BY THE NEW YEAR. HE ADDED THAT ISRAEL HAD DROPPED ITS INSISTENCE ON MINISTERIAL LEVEL REPRESENTATION AND SUBSEQUENTLY ON THE VENUE OF JERUSALEM WHICH WAS DONE AT THE INITIATIVE OF THE PRIME MINISTER HIMSELF IN A CABINET SESSION. FINALLY, HE NOTED THAT ISRAEL HAD BEEN WILLING TO ACCEPT THREE SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT FORMULAS ON NORMALIZATION IN ORDER TO GET THE TALKS MOVING. BEN-MEIR SAID THAT ISRAEL HAD TAKEN THESE STEPS BECAUSE IT AGREED WITH US THAT LEBANON SHOULD NOT BE PUSHED BEYOND THE POINT WHERE A CENTRAL GOVERNMENT COULD SURVIVE AND RETAIN THE SUPPORT OF MOST FACTIONS WITHIN LEBANON. BEN-MEIR CONCLUDED BY STATING THAT ISRAEL BELIEVES THAT IF IT DOES NOT TAKE A STAND NOW TO SECURE LEBANESE AFFIRMATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NORMAL RELATIONS THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT LATER. WE THEN SOUGHT TO EXPLORE OTHER POSSIBILITIES FOR A FORMULA WHICH WOULD HELP TO BREAK THE AGENDA DEADLOCK IN TOMORROW'S SESSION.

9. OUR FORMULA INCLUDED A FORMAL AGENDA, WHICH WOULD CONSIST OF THREE SIMPLE ITEMS AND WHICH WOULD BE MADE

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PUBLIC. IN ADDITION, THERE WOULD BE AN ACCOMPANYING EXCHANGE OF LETTERS, IN WHICH ISRAEL AND LEBANON WOULD ACCEPT THAT ALL OF THE ITEMS WHICH HAD BEEN

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INCLUDED IN THEIR RESPECTIVE, ORIGINAL AGENDAS WERE SUBSUMED UNDER THE THREE AGENDA ITEMS AND WOULD BE DISCUSSED. THE ORIGINAL ISRAELI AND LEBANESE (MINUS THE ITEM ON U.S. ROLE) AGENDAS WOULD BE ATTACHED TO THE EXCHANGE OF LETTERS. IT WAS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE EXCHANGE OF LETTERS COULD ALSO BE MADE PUBLIC.

10. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PROPOSAL SHARED WITH THE ISRAELIS TODAY. QUOTE:

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AGENDA

IT IS AGREED THAT THE AGENDA WILL CONSIST OF THE FOLLOWING ITEMS: SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS; WITHDRAWAL; AND MUTUAL RELATIONS. IN LIGHT OF THEIR INTERRELATIONSHIP, THESE ITEMS WILL BE DISCUSSED CONCURRENTLY.

DEAR DOCTOR KIMCHE AND AMBASSADOR DRAPER:

IN ACCEPTING THE U.S.-PROPOSED AGENDA TODAY, I ACCEPT THAT ALL OF THE QUESTIONS AND ISSUES LISTED IN ISRAEL'S PROPOSED AGENDA OF DECEMBER 22 (ATTACHED) ARE SUBSUMED UNDER THE THREE AGREED AGENDA ITEMS, AND THAT THE LEBANESE DELEGATION IS PREPARED TO ADDRESS THEM IN AN OPEN-MINDED WAY, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO, OR PRIOR COMMITMENT CONCERNING, THE FINAL OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

I UNDERSTAND THAT EACH DELEGATION RESERVES THE RIGHT TO RAISE SUBJECTS ADDITIONAL TO THOSE ON THE AGENDA.

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AMBASSADOR FATTAL

ATTACHMENT:

ISRAEL'S PROPOSED AGENDA OF DECEMBER 22, 1982

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ISRAELI PROPOSED AGENDA OF DECEMBER 22

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1. NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS:

- A) TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR.
- B) OPEN BORDERS.
- C) LIAISON OFFICES.
- D) CESSATION OF HOSTILE PROPAGANDA.
- E) TRADE, COMMUNICATION, TOURISM, ETC.

2. SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS:

- A) PREVENTION OF HOSTILE ACTIVITY AGAINST ISRAEL AND LEBANON.
- B) ISRAELI WARNING STATIONS.
- C) FORCES TO BE PRESENT IN THE SOUTH.
- D) RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS AND NAVAL PATROLS.
- E) LIMITATIONS OF WEAPONS AND FORTIFICATIONS.
- F) SUPERVISORY SYSTEMS.
- G) PRESENCE OF FOREIGN TROOPS IN LEBANON AND ISRAEL.

3. CONDITIONS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES:

- A) PLO DEPARTURE
- B) RETURN OF PRISONERS, MISSING AND BODIES BY SYRIA AND PLO.
- C) SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIANS.

DEAR AMBASSADOR FATTAL AND AMBASSADOR DRAPER:

IN ACCEPTING THE U.S.-PROPOSED AGENDA, I ACCEPT THAT ALL OF THE QUESTIONS AND ISSUES LISTED IN LEBANON'S PROPOSED AGENDA OF DECEMBER 28 (ATTACHMENT) ARE SUBSUMED UNDER THE THREE AGREED AGENDA ITEMS, AND THAT THE ISRAELI DELEGATION IS PREPARED TO ADDRESS THEM IN AN OPEN-MINDED WAY, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO, OR PRIOR COMMITMENT CONCERNING, THE FINAL OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

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I UNDERSTAND THAT EACH DELEGATION RESERVES THE RIGHT
TO RAISE SUBJECTS ADDITIONAL TO THOSE ON THE AGENDA.

DAVID KIMCHE

ATTACHMENT: LEBANESE PROPOSED AGENDA OF DECEMBER 20, 1982

LEBANESE PROPOSED AGENDA OF DECEMBER 20

- 1) PROGRAM OF EVACUATION.
- 2) IMMEDIATE DISPOSITIONS FOR WITHDRAWAL.
- 3) SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.
- 4) GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF RELATIONS.

UNQUOTE.

GROVE

END OF MESSAGE

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